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This paper highlights the art object nature as 
a theoretical anchor regarding contemporary 
virtual art, as well as traditional art practices, like 
painting. The analysis takes as a starting point the 
new immaterial status of the artistic object in the 
computer age. Despite the widespread prevalence 
in the analysis, our goal is to detach some key 
features as: meaning, intentionality and virtualization. 
These subjects prove to be related to each other 
and most of all, the link between intentionality and 
virtualization, brings forward the inconclusive nature 
of the art object and the decisive role of the spectator 
in the outcome of the creative process. Therefore, 
we acknowledge that the virtual fosters creativity, 
although remarking the lack of substance in some 
expressions of new media art. So, a final statement 
reassesses the importance of traditional practices, 
but now with the awareness of new media cultural 
logic, and its contribution to creation.
Keywords: Art Object; Virtualization; Intentionality; 
Digital Art; Meaning; Spectator; Traditional Practice
1 | INTRODUCTION
Identifying the essence of the object created in 
the context of artistic activity is of considerable 
importance when attempting to develop a sustained 
artistic study. In this context it is important to clarify 
the methodological approach in order to understand 
the basic theme, as well as the recognition of some 
of its features. 
In this paper we choose to develop an analysis of 
the art object concept, which will focus on themes 
such as meaning, intentionality, and virtualization, 
that describes the object in question, suggests 
the direction of the most recent art, and focus the 
spotlight on the nature of the virtual. The object 
that characterizes the scope of art, is addressed 
not as a mere object, “seizable” linked to human 
scale, but as an entity with a translation in a scope 
or aesthetic dimension, capable of integrating the 
most diverse artistic productions, from a drawing, 
painting, performance art to the computer and 
virtual art. In the end, it is left open the need for 
a theory capable of accommodating not only the 
art that seeks to maximize innovative technological 
solutions, but also those returning to traditional 
techniques (e.g., painting). 
2 | THE ART OBJECT
One idea that inspires this paper is based on 
demonstrating that the traditional notion of artistic 
“work” or “object” loses much of its “raison d’être” 
with progressive enlargement of the typological 
phenomenology of the artwork, that leads to 
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the immateriality of the work converted into an 
electronic signal or into a space of connections and 
interfaces. This new framework requires a series 
of theoretical requalifications towards a wider 
aesthetic conception. Also, and paradoxically, it is 
considered that the reference to the work or art 
object is nominally maintained, that is, having in 
sight the methodological continuity of historical-
critical analysis. In addition, the “object” establishes 
a transverse path among disciplines (art object, 
technical object, scientific object...), which includes 
new technologies in art. Moreover, as Baudrillard 
said, “the object is a whole body actor” (Baudrillard, 
2001, p 13) , and thus able to integrate contradictions 
and lean forward an autonomy which identifies itself 
with the complexity of contemporary artistic sphere.
Human society has as its main function the creation 
of objects, “objects of civilization” (Francastel, 1963) 
as is the concept of Pierre Francastel - “which are 
always made of detachable entities, recognizable 
and classifiable in series” (Francastel, 1998, p. 22). 
Thus, artists are characterized by creating art objects 
with specificity (they refer to man’s relationship 
with reality and are intended for contemplation and 
aesthetic pleasure), with characters shared with 
other human activities, and so the artists confirm 
their belonging to the community.
On another level we also invoke the contribution of 
the aesthetic theory of Jan Mukarovsky (forerunner 
of sociology and semiology of art) on the meaning of 
the artwork. The author has identified in the object 
of art an autonomous aesthetic sign consisting of a 
material artefact (a painted canvas, a copy of a book 
on paper) and an aesthetic object (what the different 
spectators see when they come in front of the 
painting or read the pages of the book, and that can 
be found in the consciousness of the community). 
The value and significance of the art object is mainly 
due to the fact that the aesthetic object distinguishes 
itself by its variability. The argument stands mainly in 
the sociological domain, as discussed below.
3 | MEANING
An art object has its own meaning of an aesthetic 
nature, that stands for its individuality, and results from 
the works reception, that is, the mental reproductions 
made by the spectator and the impact on him of these 
images. These mental reproductions vary according to 
the epoch and the social context of the experience. As 
Murakovsy says: “the same work of art is not actually 
a constant magnitude: in each shift in time, space 
or social environment , it also changes the current 
artistic tradition, through which prism the work is 
captured; as a result of these shifts also changes the 
aesthetic object in the consciousness of members of 
a given community which corresponds to the artefact 
material, the object created by the artist. Even when 
a work is positively evaluated in two different and far 
apart epochs, the object of evaluation is an aesthetic 
object always different and, therefore in a sense, is a 
different work.“ (Murakovsky, 1988, p. 64).
From these texts precursors of Czech structuralism 
(Murakovsky) and others who contributed to the 
birth of reception theory, sociologist Anna Lisa 
Tota underlines the importance of this concept of 
“aesthetic object”, which is translated into complex 
mental images that different receptors prepare 
before the same material object that remain 
unchanged in time. The author reinforces the 
importance of the role of the reception experience 
which becomes a constituent part of the artistic 
event, concluding that “the work of art is conceived 
as an act produced in the intersection between the 
vector of meanings, inscribed in the author’s own 
work, and the actual experience of enjoyment of a 
social actor that determines the meanings likely to be 
updated” (Tota, 2000, p. 43). In this sense, it is the 
receiver that retains the significance of the art object 
completing the work. It is precisely because it is the 
viewer that closes the loop, that we can stress the 
“unfinished” character of an art object. The work is 
completed successively in a multiplicity of moments, 
as many times as the viewers who have contact with 
it. However, despite this “conclusion” or meaning 
update of the work by the viewer (whom at least at 
the interpretation level becomes a co-producer of 
the work itself), the work always remains unfinished 
and open to future interpretations. According to 
this reasoning, the activity that gives meaning to 
the art object is made by the real viewer, albeit in 
part guided by the work in question. In short, as 
suggested by Anna Lisa Tota, the art object can 
always be defined “not as a set of cultural products 
in themselves, but as this same set at the time of 
enjoyment.” (Tota, 2000, p. 33).
Finally, we allude to the notion of aesthetic meaning 
with semiological traits developed by Mukarovsky. 
Formed by the readings of Saussure and Peirce 
in this field, Mukarovsky seeks to distinguish the 
aesthetic sign from the communicative sign. In 
fact, the art object “is a sign that must possess a 
supra-individual meaning” (Murakovsky, 1988, p. 
259), should appeal to everyone and not just to one 
individual. The author also distinguishes the artistic 
sign from the linguistic or communicative sign. As 
a matter of fact, communication, especially based 
on language (non-poetic), has an external purpose 
(to report an occurred fact, to express a feeling, to 
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cause a reaction in the listener). Communication is, 
as such instrumental and tends toward an external 
purpose, beyond the means of transmission (a word, 
an informative sketch, etc...). The artistic sign, in 
turn, is not a communication, and does not tend to 
anything outside itself, at least in what defines it as 
art: it has, so to speak, a purpose in itself.
“The artistic sign, unlike the communicative sign, is 
not “submissive”, i.e., is not an instrument. It does not 
establish a comprehension between people in what 
concerns things — although these are represented 
in the work — but as a determined attitude towards 
things, a certain attitude of man towards all the 
reality that surrounds him, that is, not only towards 
all the reality that the work describes. But the work 
does not communicate that attitude — as a result the 
very artistic “content” cannot be expressed in words 
— but evokes directly the receiver.”(ibid.)
This is the attitude in which we must recognize the 
“meaning” of the work, in other words, a certain 
intrinsic sense that is only objectively obtained with 
the collaboration of the spectator from his own 
relation to reality. As Mukarovsky suggests, the sense 
of the art object, although rooted in the receiver’s 
attitude, does not depend on the free will of the 
spectator, but depends on the fact that the work, by 
its means and constitution, calls his attention, focusing 
it on its internal organization. We can still add that 
when contemplating the work the receiver intuits 
a personality or a subject in the characteristics of 
the object, and that the aesthetic sign also emerges 
through this mediation operated by the work between 
these two poles, receptor-author. The creator subject 
intuited in the art object, is not external to the work, 
he is part of it and is recognizable indirectly in certain 
elements of the work. It is the determined action 
of the artist, which gives the subject a particular 
configuration and orientation, suggesting that it has 
been made with a purpose or intent. The significance 
of the art object is therefore dependent on the 
intentions of the artist who conceives it.
4 | INTENTIONALITY
The fact that we feel an art object as “made”, is 
clearly visible in a particular orientation of its shapes. 
The intentional character of the object, which also 
refers to a particular direction, which attended its 
creation, distinguishes it from an object of nature 
which has no intentionality and whose composition 
is casual. To clarify, it is also important to make the 
distinction between products of human activity 
with different intentionality (since it’s not just the 
art object that is based on an intention). That is, 
on the one hand we distinguish a group of objects 
with a specific external objective, the instruments. 
On the other hand, art objects, which differ from 
the former due to fact that they have a purpose 
in themselves. In short, we face different kinds of 
intentional constitution: the instrument seems to 
have as purpose to “serve”, while the art object 
leads man to the adoption of a receiver ś attitude 
towards its presence. Of course, there are many more 
distinctions to be made because the artistic object 
is intended for contemplation, while the technical 
and utilitarian object is directed toward functionality 
and its meaning is its use (aesthetic values are not 
discarded, but they came at most as an additional) 
- these categories have been largely described by 
M.Dufrenne and G. Simondon (Dufrenne, 2008). 
However it is essentially the distinction of the artistic 
property based on the intentionality that interests 
us here. Mukarovsky summarizes his relationship in 
a very clear statement t:
“The artwork differs from other products 
of human activity mainly because while 
intentionality converts these into things 
which are made to serve specific objectives, 
the artwork is transformed, by the same 
intentionality, into a sign not subjected to 
any external objective, but independent, 
and evocative, in man, of a certain attitude 
towards reality.“ (Murakovski, 1988, p. 259).
We know that the art object doesn’t emerge from 
a merely arbitrary action, but rather is based on 
intentions. It is clear that a work of art is the result 
of some kinds of intent or the result of a network of 
intentions designed by the artist in some stage of 
the creative process. Concerning this decisions, we 
may also accept other kind of intentions (political, 
religious), although, the aesthetic intention, must be a 
relevant one, which concerns the ability of the artwork 
to offer an aesthetic experience (Carrol, 2010, p. 188).
Moreover, the depth of the reasons for an artist to 
act determines the energy with which he commits 
himself to the creative act and the quality of his 
action. Even though the artistic process is largely 
intuitive, and owes much to spontaneity, it is of 
utmost importance to know the reason why the artist 
creates and what makes him act.
In this context several questions of an existential 
nature arise: Which are ultimately the artist’s 
intentions? Why, in the configuration of an object, 
is a particular choice or intervention is considered 
necessary? In general, when an artist is able to clarify 
and articulate his intentions it is more likely that he 
will develop a richer and more consistent work. We 
74
CITAR JOURNAL
also believe that clarifying the intent is quite different 
from pre-determining the artistic act. Above all, what 
is at stake is to discover what is really valued and 
the underlying causes of creation, free from any 
constraints. The opposite of this attitude, would 
be to impress the work of an intellectual intentions 
excess determining from the beginning its meaning. 
Indeed, Oscar Wilde already emphasized, about 
the openness recognized in the work of art more 
than a century ago  (long before Umberto Eco), as 
it potentially raises completely different messages 
from the original intention (Wilde, 1993).
It must be understood that intentionality is not 
external to the indivisible act of creation. Pierre 
Francastel already called attention to this aspect, 
noting that “art objects are complex, ambivalent 
and are not be formed by parts” (Francastel, 1963, 
p. 147). The aesthetic meaning is not therefore a fact 
inferred from a value system previously made up, in 
which case these values would be placed outside 
the moment of creation.
Intentionality is not therefore an abstract attitude; 
moreover, if you look at the artist as well as an 
historical actor, we understand that his intentions are 
assisted by a context, and that the artistic tradition 
itself is present from the beginning in the creative 
process. The artist is faced  even if, unconsciously 
with an artistic heritage from the past. Murakovsky 
anticipates here too this condition of the artistic 
activity, summarizing as follows:
“By intending to create an art work, the author 
comes into contact with the valid conception 
of the art work and art in general, with the 
artistic processes valid in the present and in 
past, that is, with the ways as were and are 
managed the various elements of a work of 
art. “(Murakovsky, 1988, p. 288).
These assumptions are similar to the most recent 
method of Jerrold Levinson (1989) to identify the art 
object, which gained some acceptance. In Levinson’s 
perspective (historicism, intentional and indexical) 
what makes an object that is intended to be an art 
object capable of being validated as such, is the fact 
that he was intentionally tied to some kind of art of 
the past and to the corresponding appropriate ways 
to treat art. Levinson defines his perspective this way: 
“A work of art is one thing (one item, object or entity) 
that was seriously designed with the intention to be 
treated-as-work-of-art, i.e., treated in any of the ways 
according to which preexisting artworks are or have 
been correctly treated”(Levinson, 2009, p. 175). In turn, 
and understandably, Levinson suggests that the artist’s 
intention can be conscious or unconscious. When 
conscious, we have a relational intention, because 
it is explicitly assumed by the artist, a relationship 
with the way art works are and have been treated. 
When unconscious (intrinsic intention), the author 
can be making art directly intending that his object 
embody a series of treatments (approaches of plastic 
themes, shapes and attitudes) without having in mind 
the intention to invoke the art of the past, although 
it may be implicit in the shapes that he composes. 
Levinson’s proposal, despite its formalism, is quite 
open in terms of intentionality, not restricting the 
freedom in creation. As the author states, this thesis 
is “not committed to the idea that these producers 
should make these intentions explicit, nor does it imply 
that they should be aware of their existence or that 
their relationship with prior art should be something 
evident to them.”(Levinson, 2009, p. 192). 
Despite a certain historicist conservatism, this method 
goes in a direction which we also contemplate, or 
would like to develop: the art object is the result of 
an action that ranges from the unconsciousness of a 
spontaneous plunge and a conscious decision.
Artistic practice thus requires an essential sense of 
direction, but from an open perspective. It is necessary 
to organize ideas and from this base proceed in search 
of meaning, through action. This requires courage 
and devotion because nothing is guaranteed, since 
creation is usually done from imbalance. Concerning 
the action and artistic creation in an unpredictable 
world, the acclaimed theater director Anne Bogart 
favours the perspective here promoted which assigns 
a determining and liberating value to intention in 
art, “Art happens in the midst of a flight. It does not 
happen from a state of balance”(Bogart, 2010, p. 39). 
The author emphasizes the importance of action and 
uses the image of a jump, in the sense that the artist’s 
devotion to the adventure of creation is comparable 
to a jump for a flight with no success guarantees. 
“The leap in itself is an unconscious act of faith, 
made possible by the consciousness of intention. Art 
happens when you intend it to happen. It happens 
when you leap with intention (...) The act is the point, 
more so now than ever. “(Ibid).
Finally, if intentionality is directly linked to action, 
namely to the artist as an agent, the truth is that it is 
often privileged as inscribed in the art object. In this 
sense, there may be some doubt about the entity that 
we are referring to when we speak about intentionality 
in the scope of art. Basically, we can understand that 
it applies both to the artist and to his work. Or as M. 
Baxandall suggested, to talk about the intention of an 
art object “is not narrating psychological events, but 
describe the relationship of painting [or object] with 
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the circumstances, assuming that the author acted 
intentionally” (Baxandall, 1985, p. 72). At first, it is 
actually the artist who confers intentionality to the art 
object, but that is also relative, as from the moment 
the work is finished (or completed the process of 
intervention by the artist) it gains autonomy and a life 
of its own, carrying with it the inscribed intentionality 
conferred by the author, or by the receiver who 
apprehends it. This spectator can also apprehend it 
differently from the original intention, thus updating 
the meaning of the work, while taking part in its 
construction over the framework already established. 
It is this cooperation of the spectator in the creation 
process that is further developed by the virtualization 
operated by new media art. 
5 | VIRTUALIZATION
The subject of the virtualization performed by art is 
the point of arrival of this approach in the domain 
of the nature of the art object. In the contemporary 
world, new technologies and data processing are 
establishing unprecedented relationships with art. 
Now, its the virtual arts (interactive art, net-art, art 
immersive environments or new hyperreal images) 
to continue the progressive enlargement of the 
typology of the art object, already mentioned at the 
beginning of this text. In fact, as stated by Oliver Grau, 
the concept of “work”, in processual or virtual, art 
tends to disappear as a single object. “Any concept 
of a work that seeks to give an idea an existential 
form for a definite period of time in space diverges 
categorically from the ontological appearance of 
a work of virtual reality. These ephemeral image 
spaces, which change within fractions of a second, 
achieve the effect of existing only through a series 
of computations in real time, 15 to 30 per second” 
(Grau, 2003, p. 205). The tendency of virtual art 
to immateriality is further underlined by the author, 
since “The immateriality of the work is a prerequisite 
for the highest possible degree of variability and 
the basis for interaction”. We verify now that the 
material component of the art object, until recently 
considered one of the least variable references 
of the works (despite the invectives of the artistic 
avant-garde, such as, action art and performance 
from the 50s and 60s), became  atomized. Indeed, 
by computation, and in what concerns images, 
materiality is limited to the individual pixel. As 
Bragança de Miranda recognizes, concerning the 
new aesthetic device, “the immaterialisation of the 
object and of the work begins with the machine, 
which afterwards creates a space where everything 
can be connected” (Miranda, 2007, p. 122). In this 
authors point of view, after the immaterialisation of 
the work through the technological apparatus, the 
aim is to meet and internalize all the relations of the 
new aesthetic object (or device). In this new phase, 
the material of the work in the classical sense, gives 
rise to a space of connections, in which variations may 
participate in the field of interactivity. This important 
moment of transition through the virtualization 
of the art object, the possible conversion into an 
interactive space, or the ontological dismissal of the 
work with the passage to the immaterial, is present 
in the analysis of other authors that focus on the 
technologies of the virtual. In this sense, Lev Manovich 
speaks of the passage “from the object to signal” in 
the context of new media, in which he specifies the 
effects of electronics and computation in art. For 
Manovich the subject of old times material, becomes 
“soft” (software), in the sense it can be expressed 
numerically, and modified in multiple dimensions 
— a feature of “new media objects”. Indeed, by 
“contrast to the material object, the electronic signal 
is essentially mutable”(Manovich, 2001, p. 133). In this 
perspective, the permanent mark the artist imprints 
on the material of the traditional art object, contrasts 
with the signal that can be modified in real time. If 
the change had already taken place with electronic 
media, the truth is that, as Manovich acknowledges, it 
appears now radicalized with digital computing: the 
object can now be modified, in the whole or its parts, 
all at once, by software based on certain algorithms. 
Virtualization in art is not limited to the most obvious 
process of immaterialisation of the object, launched 
by technology and computer media. In fact, more 
than an atomization of the material, the virtual is 
characterized by a change of identity.
Pierre Levy in his “guide” on the virtual reinforces 
this notion of heterogenesis, operated by the virtual, 
which is also a process of acceptance of otherness 
(Levy, 2001). Virtualization refers to a change in 
course, a “becoming-other” of the entity in question, 
a becoming. Also it is directly involved in art that 
operates “the most virtualizing of the activities.” 
The virtual fosters creativity, in that it favours the 
transformation movements characteristic of the 
creation process and the genesis of the art object. 
Artistic creation does not happen in a place of stable 
reference, and often becomes an evasion from a 
place, a leap into the unknown, a deterritorialization. 
Inspiring much theory in this field, Gilles Deleuze 
also made attempts to approach conceptually the 
new virtual object. Resembling various concepts 
in his work,  we may refer briefly to the “objectile”, 
described in a work about Leibniz and the baroque 
: “As Bernard Cache has demonstrated, this is a very 
modern conception of the technological object (…).
The new status of the object no longer refers its 
condition to a spatial mold — in other words, to a 
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relation of form-matter but to a temporal modulation 
that implies as much the beginnings of a continuous 
variation of matter as continuous development in 
form.” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 19).
Virtualization, being an event, reinforces the 
inconclusive nature of the art object, in which is 
always possible to recognize a force, or some kind of 
power. The subject can therefore be understood as 
a problematic field, which, ultimately, the spectator 
can upgrade. That’s why in a certain way, the art 
object aims to an otherness that takes place in the 
encounter with the spectator, who complements and 
extends the author’s creative process. This model, 
which is a cooperation author-receiver, can also be 
understood as a dynamic interaction between both 
of them mediated by the art object, as mentioned in 
another context by Bragança de Miranda. Although 
the interactive issue is linked to the virtual, it would 
require some theoretical approach in itself, which is 
not to be accomplished in this paper.
Nevertheless, concepts such as “variability” or “com-
binatory”, pervades both virtual and interactive 
realms, which José Augusto Mourão reinforces in 
the context of the new world of hypermedia: “the 
virtual object begins by being defined as a system 
of relations”, and adds that this “can be defined as 
any object by its attributes but is independent and 
relies on a device of determinations that is also likely 
to change in the framework of its own combinatory” 
(Mourão, 2001, p. 49). After all, this system develops 
multiple kinds of connections in the virtual realm, 
which requires a transformation process to be 
accomplished by interactivity. Although it is the 
creator that establishes the system, through the 
parameterization of an idea (algorithm). It is the user 
who enacts the artwork, and extracts meaning from 
the interactive object, bringing it to life. 
This combinatory, articulated directly by man or 
controlled by a computer model, emphasizes the 
artificial nature of the art object, which in the virtual 
space, not real and simulated, finds one of its ultimate 
expressions.
Here, the paradigm of hyper-reality of Baudrillard, 
also fits this last expression of the art object, 
converted to an interactive system that is essentially 
operational. But the dubious nature of this art 
object that enacts a lacking substance, and that 
constitutes a simulacra, stems, as Baudrillard 
suggests, from the “radical negation of the sign as 
value, and (...) the sign as reversion and suppression 
of all reference” (Baudrillard, 1991, p. 13) (it actually 
ceases to exist to establish signic equivalence). 
The abolition of signification that marks this “aes-
thetics of disappearance”, the fading of the real, 
which Baudrillard shares with Virilio (despite of 
the broader skepticism of the latter on its effects) 
is certainly a complex issue with its dangers. On 
the origin of this model, in which the difference 
between copy and reality ceases to exist, is quite 
possibly an excessive appreciation of Nietzschean 
relativism by the French post-structuralist theory. If 
the theories of art formulated on this basis, appear 
to serve presently the new virtual art, the truth is 
that they may fail in regard to embrace the artistic 
phenomenon as a whole — much of technologically 
advanced art results often spiritually impoverished, 
without exploring effectively the new issues at stake. 
Under that circumstance it could be of interest the 
adoption of a model that welcomes very different 
practices, and resolve with equal dignity of expressive 
possibilities, traditional methodologies and very 
advanced methodologies, such as the virtual. The 
return to traditional techniques such as painting, with 
the awareness of the cultural logic of new media, 
would not be in this sense an “anachronistic” or 
marginal behaviour, in fact, it can be stated as the 
vehicle for a new direction.
6 | CONCLUSION
The need to inform various approaches in art practice, 
in an era in which technology seems, sometimes, to 
override aesthetic concerns, demanded to clarify the 
nature of the artistic object. Taking as key features, 
meaning, intentionality and virtualization, we found 
a theoretical basis that hopefully may go beyond 
research concerns, becoming also an asset in art 
practice, in this age of digital computing.
After this analysis, we again emphasize that the 
issue of interactivity in art, requires an analysis in 
itself, though in fact, as we acknowledge, it is already 
implicated in virtualization. So, although interactivity 
is defined by factors such as virtualization (besides, 
variability, permeability and contingency (Gianetti, 
2012, p. 180), we may consider that virtualization is 
broader, and many expressions of digital art, don’t 
necessarily imply interactivity. 
Finally, we are also aware of the difficulties of our 
approach, of an enlarged theory, which is aimed both 
at art using new media, and at traditional practices. 
But although we agree that more specific approaches 
are welcome, we consider that analysis with a broader 
extent, like ours, should not present partial visions as 
an outcome, because that would restrain the aesthetic 
experience. In this sense, we do not consider that 
technology by itself, guarantees meaningful artistic 
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creation, so we reject that “the new aesthetic object 
in interactive art, should be appointed as technology 
aesthetics” (Yoon; Kim, 2006, p. 126).
In fact, If artistic  creation  should  not be separated 
from technological  means and the new challenges 
it creates, but  this  doesn’t  imply  that technology 
must replace  the meaning  which  the artwork 
should deploy, the intention that mobilizes it and 
the empowerment that virtualization brings forward.
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